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be extended to misdemeanants."
Seemingly, right to counsel should be expanded. A defendant faces be-
fore, during, and after trial a bewildering variety of rules. He is ill-equip-
ped to face, on equal terms, his well-trained adversaries. These factors
arise in important cases as well as in not so important ones. Providing the
needed counsel presents a serious challenge to American legal resources and
ingenuity. Shall the needed counsel be provided through private defender
systems, public defender system, legal clinics staffed by law school stu-
dents, or some combination of the three? The answer will lie in some bal-
ance of the desirability of providing counsel for all and the practicality of
a limited number of competent practitioners. The answer can be a flexible
standard which inherently is vague or a fixed standard which may seem
arbitrary. The Minnesota Supreme Court has opted for a fixed standard,
which in view of the problems created by the vague Betts holding, is prob-
ably for the best. The Borst approach, especially if modified along the lines
suggested by Mr. Justice Peterson, is a logical approach. It has the advan-
tage of affording a clear-cut rule which can be applied by even the usually
non-legally-educated local magistrates. It is not the best of all answers, but,
given the state of legal services in the United States, it represents a logical
compromise. But though Borst represents a logical, justifiable resting place,
only the United States Supreme Court can decide just how permanent this
resting place will be.
Gary R. Rice
Statutory Merger Involves a Purchase or
Sale of Securities for Purposes of Rule 1 Ob-5
The defendants, a group of officers and directors of the Susquehanna
Corporation (the "Lannan Group"), conspired with one Korholz to de-
fraud Susquehanna. Initially, the Lannan Group sold 435,000 shares of
Susquehana to Korholz at a price $1,740,000 in excess of fair market
value. The group then resigned, vesting control of Susquehanna in Korholz
and his nominees. Korholz, who was also chairman of the board of another
corporation, American Gypsum, sold the Susquehanna shares to Gypsum,
which obtained a bank loan for substantially all of the purchase price.
Finally, Korholz caused the boards of directors of Gypsum and Susque-
hanna to recommend to their stockholders a statutory merger' of Gypsum
into Susquehanna. The terms of the merger provided for an exchange of
1.9 shares of Gypsum for one share of Susquehanna, a ratio which repre-
sented a gross over-valuation of Gypsum. These fraudulent manipulations
prompted a derivative suit by several minority shareholders of Susquehan-
71 On this subject in general, see Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963).
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 368(a) (1) (A).
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na, who alleged a violation of rule lob-52 on the ground that the Lannan
Group had fraudulently caused Susquehanna to acquire 435,000 shares of
its own stock at a price $1,740,000 in excess of fair market value.! The
district court dismissed the derivative action because of the plaintiffs' fail-
ure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, stating that a statu-
tory merger does not involve a "purchase or sale" of securities for purposes
of rule lob-5.4 An alternative ground for the dismissal was that the dis-
trict court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, since corporate man-
agement and the fiduciary duty of directors to their corporations is pri-
marily regulated by state law.' Held, reversed: The issuance of shares by a
corporation in exchange for shares of another corporation pursuant to a
statutory merger involves a purchase or sale of securities under the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380
F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
I. RULE 10b-5
While rule lob-5 is but one of several anti-fraud provisions in the fed-
eral securities laws, it is by far the broadest in coverage. Promulgated in
1942 pursuant to section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,'
the rule closed a previously-existing loophole in the anti-fraud provisions
by providing protection against fraud by both purchasers and sellers of
securities.! One of the elements that a plaintiff seeking to bring a rule
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1968), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3 Susquehanna acquired Gypsum's assets, which included the 435,000 Susquehanna shares, and
obligations, including the bank loan for the purchase of the shares at the inflated price.
SDasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
'Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952) (insider's sale of control to third persons at premium). The court denied relief to the
plaintiff, suing derivatively, and stated that section 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
rather than at the fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs .... ... Id. at 464. Actually,
Birnbaum is frail support for this proposition, since the oft-quoted statement was merely dictum;
furthermore, the actual ground for dismissal was that the corporation was neither seller nor pur-
chaser and was not a party to the transaction and therefore had no right enforceable under rule
1ob-S.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). Section 10(b) did not by its terms make unlawful any conduct
or activity, but conferred rule-making power upon the Commission to condemn deceptive practices
in the sale or purchase of securities.
7A. BtOMBERO, SFCURITIEs LAw-FR.AuD--SEC RuLE 10b-5, at 19-20 (1967); SEC Securities
Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942):
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a rule
prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities. The
previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to
brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud
administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buy-
ing securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase. The text of the Commission's
action follows: 'The Securities and Exchange Commission, deeming it necessary for
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10b-5 action must establish is that the transaction he is attacking consti-
tuted a "purchase or sale" of a security Unfortunately, the meaning and
scope of this phrase have been the subjects of controversy. One particularly
important question has been whether a statutory merger involves a "pur-
chase or sale" of securities. This question has been answered both affirma-
tively and negatively by the administrative agencies and courts.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF "PURCHASE OR SALE"
When considering whether a statutory merger is a "purchase or sale" for
purposes of the anti-fraud provisions, the administrative agencies have
paid particular attention to their construction of "sale" for purposes of the
registration provision of the Securities Act of 1933.' In this connection,
the Commission's interpretation of the phrase has changed at least four
times. In early 1934 the Federal Trade Commission took the position that
a merger was a "sale" for registration purposes." This interpretation was
premised on the expressly stated legislative purpose that "sale" was to be
"defined broadly."" After the Securities and Exchange Commission was
created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," the Commission re-
versed this initial interpretation and held that a merger was not a "sale"
and did not require registration." Ultimately, the Commission incorpo-
rated this so-called "no-sale theory" in a note to rule 5 of form E-1, the
form for most registrations in 193 5.14 In 1941 the Commission apparently
again changed its position and expressed concern to Congress because mer-
the exercise of the functions vested in it and necessary and appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of investors so to do, pursuant to authority
conferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, particularly Sections
10 (b) and 23 (a) thereof, hereby adopts the following Rule X-10B-5.'
See note 2 supra for text of the rule. The designation X-10B-5 remained until the general renum-
bering in 1956-1957, when it became lob-5.
'The basic elements of a cause of action under rule 10b-5 are (1) a purchase or sale of a
security; (2) an interstate contact; (3) a deception in connection with the purchase or sale, usually
in the form of a material misrepresentation or omission; (4) reliance upon the deception; and
(5) injury to the purchaser or seller as a result of this reliance.
°15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964). See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 518 (2d ed. 1961);
Purcell, A Consideration of the No-Sale Theory Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 254 (1958); Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. LAW. 78
(1957); Sommer, Mergers, Conssolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 11
(1964); Comment, Rule 133 and the No Sale Theory: Interpretation or Legislation?, 13 J. PUB.
L. 520 (1964); Note, Securities Regulation--Statutory Merger Involves a "Purchase" or "Sale"
Under Section 10(b), 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 362 (1967); Note, The SEC's No-Sale Rule and Ex-
changes of Securities Pursuant to Voluntary Reorganizations, 67 HARv. L. Rev. 1237 (1954).
" The Securities Act of 1933 was administered for some months in its infancy by the Federal
Trade Commission until the SEC was created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(d)(a) (1964). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3698 (Oct. 2, 1956); Sargent, supra note
9, at 79.
"Sargent, supra note 9, at 79. H.R. REP. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) stated:
"The term 'sale' or 'sell' is defined broadly to include every attempt or offer to dispose of a security
for value." (Emphasis added.)
1215 U.S.C. S 78(d)(a) (1964).
13L. Loss, supra note 9, at 520; Sargent, supra note 9, at 79; Comment, supra note 9, at 521;
letter of SEC Chairman, p. 3, made public as part of SEC Securities Act Release No. 3762
(March 15, 1967).
" L. Loss, supra note 9, at 520; Comment, supra note 9, at 521; SEC Securities Act Release
No. 493(c) (Sept. 20, 1935). The Commissioner deemed no "sale" to be involved when "there
is submitted to the vote of such stockholders a proposal for the transfer of assets of such corpora-
tion to another person in consideration of the issuance of securities of such other person, or a plan
or agreement for a statutory merger or consolidation."
gers and consolidations were not subject to registration. However, when
the Commission failed to make any specific proposal, Congress took no
action. 5 By 1943 the Commission had again changed its mind, contending
vigorously that consolidations did not involve a "sale" of securities for the
purposes of registration." Although the Commission abolished form E-1 in
1947, it continued to follow the "no-sale theory" administratively by
excluding mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets from the scope of the
registration provision of the Securities Act of 1933.1" In 1951 the Commis-
sion officially codified the "no-sale theory" in rule 133,"6 which provides
that statutory mergers and consolidations do not involve "sales."'" How-
ever, the Commission expressly limited rule 133 to the registration provi-
sion of the Securities Act of 1933 and stated that it was inapplicable to the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws."° Thus, as far as the
Commission was concerned, a statutory merger was a "purchase or sale"
for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions. The Commission has continued
to take this position and is now firmly in favor of applying section 10 (b)
and rule lob-5 to statutory mergers."
On the surface it appears that the Commission's inconsistency in defin-
ing "sale" as it applies to mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets in the
registration provision and in the anti-fraud provisions is not justified.
However, one explanation for the inconsistency is that requiring registra-
tion of these transactions unnecessarily burdens companies which presently
disclose through proxy solicitations the essential facts of the merger or
consolidation.2 The proxies covering a merger or consolidation accomplish
the same result as a registration-full disclosure in the issuance of the se-
curities. On the other hand, since mergers and consolidations provide op-
portunities for fraud, the Commission has deemed it wise to make them
subject to the anti-fraud provisions. Such a treatment of mergers and con-
solidations appears to be in accord with the legislative intent of section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, under which rule 10b-5 was promulgated.
III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF "PURCHASE OR SALE"
Despite the Commission's struggles, the question of whether a statutory
15 Comment, supra note 9, at 522; Hearings Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H.R. 4344, 5065, 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 843, 845 (1941).
"' In National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 134 F.2d 689, 694 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943), the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief stating that a consolidation did
not involve a sale.
" L. Loss, supra note 9, at 521; Sargent, supra note 9, at 80; Sommer, supra note 9, at 15;
Comment, supra note 9, at 523; SEC Securities Act Release No. 3211 (April 14, 1947).
18 Sargent, supra note 9, at 80; Comment, supra note 9, at 523; SEC Securities Act Release No.
3420 (Aug. 2, 1951).
19 Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1968).
"
5 Comment, supra note 9, at 524; SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951) pro-
vided that "[a]s a matter of statutory construction the Commission does not deem the 'no sale
theory' which is described in the rule as being applicable for purposes of any of the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."
"'Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 6-28, Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th
Cir. 1967); Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 5, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1967); Note, Securities Regulation-Statutory Merger Involves a "Purchase" or "Sale" Under
Section 10(b), 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 362, 366 (1967).
22 Sargent, supra note 9, at 80; see Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 15-20, Dasho v. Susque-
hanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Note, supra note 21, at 366.
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merger amounts to a "purchase or sale" for purposes of the anti-fraud pro-
visions has not often come before the courts. In 1943 in National Supply
Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior University' the Ninth Circuit dealt with
the closely related question of whether a consolidation, as opposed to a sta-
tutory merger, was a "purchase or sale" of securities. The court agreed
with the then current position of the Securities Exchange Commission that
a consolidation was not a "sale" for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions,
although this was not the principal basis of the decision.'
However, in the relatively few cases which have been decided since Le-
land Stanford, the courts have trended toward a broader definition of "pur-
chase or sale" for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions. In the 1960 case
of H.L. Green Co. v. Childree,' Green Co. instituted a section 10 (b) ac-
tion after it had issued its stock in exchange for the stock of another cor-
poration pursuant to a merger. Defendants were certified public account-
ants who allegedly prepared false financial statements and made other
misrepresentations with intent to induce plaintiff to enter into the merger.
Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff had failed to
state a claim within section 10(b) because the transaction was a merger
and not a "purchase or sale" of securities. In denying the defendants' mo-
tion, the New York district court noted that a merger "may or may not
involve a purchase and sale within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the
Act," but that the transaction before the court appeared to be a purchase
and sale.2"
Recently, in Simon v. New Haven Board &q Carton Co.7 a Connecticut
district court apparently considered a statutory merger a "purchase or sale"
within rule 10b-5, but the issue was not raised and the court did not dis-
cuss it. In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court held that corporate issuance of stock is a sale within the
meaning of rule lob-5.2s Thus, the court never reached the question of
whether a statutory merger was a "sale" for purposes of the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp."' was the first case in which
a district court squarely faced the issue of whether a statutory merger in-
volved a "purchase or sale" within the meaning of section 10 (b) and rule
1ob-5. There, the merger of a subsidiary into the parent company was ac-
complished under Delaware law without shareholder approval because the
23 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
24 Id. at 694.
2 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
26 Id. at 96.
27250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
'81d. at 299. The court followed Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1964),
where a majority of the board of directors, withholding the latest financial information from the
remaining directors, approved issuance of 75,000 shares, to be sold to the corporation's president
at an amount below the real value of the shares. The court stated, "the issuance by a corporation
of its own shares is a 'sale' to which the anti-fraud policy expressed in the federal securities laws
extends." Similarly, in Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 200-03 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961), a corporation was mislead by fraud in the issuance of
stock in return for worthless property. The court held that the issuance by a corporation of its
own stock is a sale under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
22241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
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parent owned more than ninety per cent of the subsidiary's stock. Under
the terms of the merger agreement, minority shareholders of the subsidiary,
including plaintiff Voege, were required to surrender their stock in the sub-
sidiary for a price grossly below its fair market value. Alleging fraud in
determining the price at which she was compelled to surrender her shares,
Voege sued under rule lob-5. The court concluded that a statutory merger
involved a "sale" within the meaning of that rule.' "Any other view of the
transaction," the court stated, "would defeat the purpose of Rule lob-5. '
Most recently, the Second Circuit in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co."
joined the trend of broadening the definition of "purchase or sale" by
holding that a short-form merger" involved a "purchase or sale" of secur-
ities under section 10 (b) and rule 1ob-5.' In this case the Class A share-
holders of Crown Finance Co. were defrauded of approximately $900,000
by their officers and directors, who were in collusion with Beneficial Fi-
nance Co. The allegedly fraudulent scheme was accomplished by a short-
form merger of Crown into a wholly-owned New York subsidiary of
Beneficial. The merger agreement required the surrender of the Class A
shares in return for cash payments. Thus, the plaintiff became a "forced"
seller of securities when the merger was consummated without his con-
sent. The court apparently construed the definition of "sale" to include this
plaintiff because a sale was inevitable.
IV. DASHO V. SUSQUEHANNA CORP.
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp. is the first case in which an appellate court
has decided whether a statutory merger involves a "purchase or sale" for
purposes of rule 10b-5." An examination of Dasho is aided by a breakdown
of the successive transactions as follows: first, the Lannan-Korholz sale
of 435,000 shares of Susquehanna stock at a value in excess of fair market
value; second, the Korholz-Gypsum sale of these shares; and third, the
Susquehanna-Gypsum statutory merger. The primary controversy was
whether a rule lob-5 cause of action in favor of Susquehanna could be
based upon the fraudulent scheme. The stockholders of Susquehanna were
not privy to the initial Lannan-Korholz sale, nor were they privy to the
Korholz-Gypsum sale. They were, however, privy to the Susquehanna-
Gypsum merger. Thus, the issue narrowed to whether the statutory mer-
ger involved a "purchase or sale."
The district court had ruled that the transaction was not a "sale." That
court distinguished a statutory merger from other transactions in which
a corporation exchanges its stock for stock of another corporation, reason-
ing that in a statutory merger the exchange is "involuntary," while in a
' Id. at 374.
31 Id.
a 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
a In a "short-form" merger approval by the shareholders of both corporations is not required
as it is in a statutory "long-form" merger. The "short-form" merger is consummated by a resolu-
tion of the board of directors of a parent corporation which owns a certain percentage (set by
statute) of the outstanding shares of each class of a subsidiary.
34374 F.2d at 635.
5 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
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sale the exchange is voluntary." Strictly speaking, the district court was cor-
rect. Neat corporate theory would dictate that the Susquehanna shares were
not "sold" for shares of Gypsum, but upon merger Susquehanna merely
converted shareholders' security from one form to another." Once the mer-
ger was approved, the exchange was automatic, and the shareholders had no
control over it. The court of appeals, however, rejected this line of reason-
ing, concluding that "the district court was unduly impressed by the se-
mantic and conceptual difficulties arising when the words 'purchase' and
'sale' are applied to merger.""
Apparently, the district court's error was failure to recognize that the
injured parties were not the Susquehanna shareholders, who, after the
merger had been approved, could only surrender their shares for shares of
the surviving corporation or receive the appraised value of their shares in
cash. Instead, the injured party was the surviving corporation, Susquehan-
na. Moreover, the injury to Susquehanna occurred under the proposed
merger agreement requiring Susquehanna to issue its shares for shares of
Gypsum, not in the subsequent physical exchange of the shares in con-
summation of the merger.
Although the court of appeals seems to have reached the correct result
in Dasho, the majority opinion is quite vague as to which transaction con-
stituted the "purchase or sale." Was it the issuance by the acquiring cor-
poration, Susquehanna? Was it the surrender of shares by the holders of the
acquired corporation, Gypsum? Or was it the exchange pursuant to the
statutory merger? Apparently, all of these are purchases and sales, but the
court was not specific on this point.
The majority opinion also fails to deal with the alternative ground of
the district court decision, namely, that this was only a case of "corporate
mismanagement" and thus, according to Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,"0 not within rule 10b-5. Birnbaum was bad law to begin with and
is being rapidly discredited, most recently by the Second Circuit, which
originally decided it." Apparently, the Seventh Circuit in Dasho is rejecting
Birnbaum too. Although the majority opinion fails to mention that case,
its rejection may be inferred from the undifferentiated reversal of the dis-
trict court decision and the explicit language of the concurring opinion."
V. CONCLUSION
The Dasho holding that a statutory merger involves a "purchase or sale"
for purposes of rule 10b-5 is consistent with legislative history, administra-
tive construction, and recent judicial decisions. Moreover, the extension of
the scope of rule 10b-5 provides defrauded shareholders and corporations
with a uniform remedy which may be applied to challenge corporate trans-
30Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508, 511 (N.D. Il. 1966).
'7380 F.2d at 268.
as Id. at 267.
39 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
'0A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
4' 380 F.2d at 269.
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actions. Currently, the application of this rule to corporate transactions is
in a state of flux. Dasho could have brought some order to this unsettled
area. But unfortunately, the imprecise language and confusion of the
opinion is more likely to lead to judicial battles as to what this case means.
Robert M. Bandy
